John Austin or Jane Austen?
The Province of Jurisprudence Determined in Pride and Prejudice
William MacNeil
It used to be a truth universally acknowledged that the novels of Jane Austen were narratives in want ofcontext.} The Napoleonic Wars, industrialisation and the French Revolution: in fact, all the great and heroic events ofthe period are conspicuous by their absence in the 'little bit (two Inches wide) of ivory' upon which dear Jane worked with 'so Fine a brush'.2 Post-colonial critics, however, have sensitised readers to the traces of context on the margins of Austen's oeuvre, and how, despite this marginalityor perhaps, as the Derrideans would say, because orit -they perform an absolutely central function in terms of the novels's plotting, characte.rology and thematics. For example, the imperial context ofMansfield Park is the principal focus of Edward Said's celebrated reading ofthat text in Culture and Imperialism (1994: 95-116) . There, Said's reading turns on an often overlooked narrative detail of the novel: the significance of Sir Thomas Bertrams's Jamaican estate which, while a literal absence in the text (no scene is'aftually set there, though some characters -Sir Thomas notably -go missing occasionally from the storyline because of visits there), is, nonetheless, a pervasive imaginative presence (as the site and source of the Bertram family fortune). Mansfield Park, an all pervasive thematic presence in Pride and Prejudice, informing much of its character motivation and constituting the key plot mechanism driving its narrative action.
The law I speak of is the law ofinheritance: specifically, the legal device of the 'entail' which obtains over Longbourn, the modest country seat of the Bennet family. An entail settles property on, and fixes a prescribed line of succession which cannot be altered by any ofthose individuals in whom the entailed property vests.
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The entail on Longbonrn is in the male line (and is settled upon Mr Bennet's nearest male next-of-kin, his cousin, Mr Collins), thereby disinheriting, and, ultimately dispossessing the Bennet sisters upon the death of their father (much adverted to by Mrs Bennet, and a source of much of the novel's 'gallows's humour').
This instantiation ofwhat Lacan would call the 'law ofthe Father's Name' activates, as no other device does, the plot of the novel, shifting its setting from the rather static country house comedy of manners -which the opening chapters, with their focus on the badinage ofMr and Mrs Bennet, would suggestto a more dynamic line of action which moves, briskly, from Longbourn to Meryton, and then onto Netherfield, Hunsford, Rosings, Gracechurch St and Pemberley. This shift is more than just scenic; it is thematic, particularly in the initial displacement from Longbourn to Meryton. Though the physical distance between the two is slight, the psychic distance is great, as Meryton seems to be outside the law as much as Longbourn is clearly within it. For all is fixity at Longbourn -its past is a matter ofrecord; its future predetermined: both temporalities secured by virtue of the legal device ofthe entail-while nothing is fixed in Meryton.
Its condition, instead, is one offlux, functioning as a kind ofno man's land, belonging to no one in particular but through which everyone in general passes: for example, those disrupted by war, like Col Foster's regiment of Capt Carter, Denny and Wickham; or those orphaned inheritors of property like Miss King, Wickham's obscure object ofdesire; or those who belong nowhere and everywhere like the rootless 'new rich', the Bingleys, whose leased manorhouse, Netherfield, could act as a metaphor for all ofMeryton and its environs. For everything is 'To Let' in Meryton, not just Netherfield but, so it seems from Mrs Bennet, 'Hay.. Park ... the great house at Stoke .. , Ashworth and Purvis Lodge' (III, VIII, 198 All of which is co say thac, perhaps, Meryton is not so much outside the Law as previously suggested. Indeed, the constant round of offer, counter-offer, rejection and acceptance which constitutes .much ofMeryton's social tie suggests a regime which, while very different from that ofLongbourn's entailment and its status certainties, is, nonetheless, a legal regime: namely that of contract. Of course, the contract most often negotiated in Meryton is the marriage contract, itself a bargain for a new sort ofstatus. But note the .absence ofgreat arranged alliances of the classic status society. Only one such example is proferr€d in the novel: that ofMiss Ann de Bourgh to Darcy, an engagement which even Lady Catherine describes as of a 'peculiar kind' (III, XI~228) and which never comes to fruition. Thus, even aristocratic marriage in the novel has come under the sway of contract's exchange values. For those actually in Meryton and subject directly to its regime of contract, like the dispossessed Bennet sisters, the change is even more dramatic; they enact what the eminent nineteenth-century legal anthropologist and comparativist Sir Henry Maine said was the classic move of 'modernity', a move which is also jurisprudential: the movement from status to contract (Maine 1963: 165) .
The citation of this well-worn formula -the move from status to contract -should-not be read, however, as some Whiggish celebration of the shift from Longbourn (the society of status) to Meryton (the society of contract)was allegorising the movement from the realm ofnecessity to that offreedom. Make no mistake about it, Meryton is no realm of freedom released from the constraints of necessity. Options, choices, even autonomy itselfare constrained there by the material conditions within which each ofits inhabitants is situated, and which skew, in turn, the putatively level playing field of freedom ofcontract, and, indeed, the entire network ofcapitalist relations ofwhich it is a symbol. Consider just one example: Jane Bennet's explanation to the appalled Elizabeth why her dose· friend and confidante, ) Charlotte Lucas, would entertain, let alone accept, a man ofMr Collins's severe limitations. 'Remember that she is one of a large family; that as to fortune, it is a most eligible match'(II, I, 88).
Examples such as these -pointing to material conditions which constrain and distort the freedom of contract and Capitalproliferate throughout the novel, so much so that the representation which emerges of Meryton, and its regime of contract, is anything but an 'Eden of the innate rights of man', Or, ifit is a paradisal realm ofthe Rousseauesque social contract, then it is only so in the highly ironic way Marx -the author of the above cited sobriquet -intended it in Capital: that is, as a place where 'alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham', so that freedom produces wage slavery, equality leads to substantive inequit)r, property reinforces rather than challenges bourgeois privilege, and Bentham masks and mitigates the masterslave relationship between, as he puts it in Capital, 'the capitalist; (and) the possessor oflabour-power (who) follows as his labourer. The one with an air ofimportance, smirking, intent on business; the other, timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to market and has nothing to expect but -a hiding' (Marx 1954: 416 her poison pen letters to Jane, Caroline Bingley uses a very teUing phrase to describe the hoped""for match between her brother, Charles, and Georgiana Darcy. This alliance of 'brass and class' is described as producing 'the happjness of so many' (I, XXI, 79), a phrasing which evokes the first principle of utility itself: the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number'.-4 Charlotte Lucas goes even further in her language, so much so that I wonder if she is, indeed, the author of the Introduction to the Principles of Morals andLegislation, because from the first scenes in which she is introduced -the visit to Lucas Lodge, following the assembly (I, V), and then at the reception at the Lodge -she speaks not only of 'happiness' but 'felicity' (I, VI, 16) , that other great Benthamitebuzzword with all of its associations of the 'calculus of felicity'.5 And calculate she does: urging Jane to display rather than conceal her affection for ningley, after weighing all the advantages and disadvantages ofone or the other mode ofconduct (I, VI, 15); accepting Mr Collins's offer of marriage out of the 'pure and disinterested desire of an establishment' (I, XXII, 82); and even pairing off Elizabeth, when staying at Hunsford, with Darcy rather than Col Fitzwilliam because ofthe former's access to Anglican Church patronage (II, IX, 118 , is marked by a doubleness which releases not only too little but also too muchjouissance into the regime ofcontract as well as Capital,an excess ofpleasure which overreaches itself, enacting utility's law of desire -the desire for more -at the very moment at which it undermines its desire for law -and its moderation ofthe desire for more. Lydia Bennet's amorous career is a graphic illustration of the utility principle run amok: 'untamed, unabashed, wild) noisy, and fearless' (III, IX, 201) . In her, the calculus offelicity becomes the 'thoughtless' (III, V, 186) pursuit of pleasure of the crassest kind -'extravagant in wants and heedless of the future' (III, XIX, 248), driving her from the seaside pavilions of Brighton to Londons demimondaine and then finally to a shabby genteel existence, 'unsettled in the extreme' (III, XIX, 249) on the fringe of good society in the North. It is only, however, with the figure of Mrs Bennet that utility reac4es its real apogee ofself-defeating excess, so much so that it produces a kind of paralysis. Hers is probably one of the most interesting pathological characters drawn in literature, condensing~as she does a variety ofsymptoms figured individually in the other utilitarian characters: Lydia's licentiousness (in Mrs Bennet's own self-confessed fixation with officers in youth, 'I confessed ... I cried for two days together-when Colonel Millar's regiment went away' (II, XVIII, 148», Charlotte's opportunism CA single man oflarge fortune; four or five thousand a year' (I, I, 1) is, after all, Mrs Bennet's beau ideal as much as Charlotte's) and Caroline's social climbing (Mrs Bennet is, as well, a woman of the middle classes -though the Meryton petit bourgeois rather than the London haut bourgeois of the Bingleys -pressing her way, and her family's, into the gentry and nobility). These symptoms, once condensed, are then converted, rearticulated and literally written on the 'nervous' body of Mrs Bennet, a reinscription which supplies as vivid a metaphor as there ever was for the hysterical excess of Capital, contract and its law of desire, utility: 'I ... have', says Mrs Bennet, 'such tremblings, such flutterings allover me, such spasms in my side, and pains in my head, and such beatings in my heart' (III, V, 184).
It is precisely to escape this version ofwhat might be called the 'monstrous materna1'6 -and the hysterical, nay psychotic logic ofMeryton's Capital, contract and utility which it figuresthat triggers Elizabeth's departure for Hunsford to stay at the invitation ofCharlotte Lucas, now Mrs Collins. This second scene shift in the novel is, however, not so much a departure for Elizabeth as it is a return; for, in journeying to the Collinses' vicarage, Elizabeth arrives back, at least thematically, in the same world of statu·s· with which the novel opened at Longbourn. Indeed, this world is much more status-conscious than Longhourn, being figured in the far grander, even ostentatious Rosings Park, the stately home and seat of the 'respectable, ancient, honourable though untitled' (III, XI\!' 228) de Bourgh family, furnished with, among other things, Mr Collins' objet petit a, the chimneypiece in one of the drawing rooms alone, costing 'eight hundred pounds' (1, XVI,S 1). Certainly; the regime of status is intensified here to a degree "that would satisfy any Continental court ofthe ancien regime, its letter ofthe law being followed strictly: 'Do not make yourself uneasy, my dear cousin, about your apparel' says Mr Collins to Elizabeth on the eve of her first visit to Rosings, 'Lady Catherine is far from requiring that degree ofelegance ofdress in us, which becomes herself and her daughter.... She likes to have the distinction ofrank preserved' (II, VI, 105). For Lady Catherine is the very spirit of the old, aristocratic order ofthe eighteenth-century with its compulsions about protocol, its obsessions over precedence -'I am excessively attentive to all those things' (II, XIV: 137), she says -pathologies, incidentally, in marked contrast to the hysteria of Meryton.
In fact, Lady Catherine, and the world she represents, is quite the reverse of Meryton and its values. Unlike Meryton's faux gentry -take the example of the Lucases, recently in trade but now reinventing themselves as knighted country squires (I, V) -Lady Catherine is the 'real thing' (even, one might say, tpe horrifying das Ding of Kant and Lacan).7 No respectably born chatelaine her, Lady Catherine bears, instead, the coronet, quarterings and honorific befitting an earl's daughter, and so ranks, by birth, even above the de Bourghs and the Dareys; indeed, in the social world of the novel, she is its very pinnacle. And it is precisely this positioning at the very top ofthe hierarchy and, indeed, as the spokeswoman for the previously unassailable, but now threatened and soon to be displaced aristocratic hegemon -this is, after all, a revolutionary eta -that makes her the implacable class enemy of an (upstart ... of a young woman without famil)', connections, or fortune' (III, XI\!, 229), the irredeemably middle-class Elizabeth Bennet. For Lady Catherine is Elizabeth's principal nemesis, and, more than any other character in Pride and Prejudice, she is the 'villain of the piece' exceeding George Wickham's selfishness, Caroline Bingley's spitefulness and Mrs Bennet's meanness ofspirit, though, unlike any of these characters fortune and rank have given Lady Catherine the power to implement her fantasies ofcontrol. And with what, to quote Mr Collins, 'affability' and 'condescension' (I, XI~45) -in short, 'enjoyment' in its darkest LacanianZizekian 8 sense -she carries out that control: 'improving' the vicarage and Charlotte's housewifery (II,VI, 107); trading in the acceptable wage slavery of the period -the hiring and firing of governesses -by entrusting that 'treasure', Miss Pope-to Lady Metcalf (II, VI, 108); and scheming, since their birth, for Darcy and Anne's marriage: 'From their infancy, they have-been intended for each other. It was the favourite wish of his mother; as well as her's. While in their cradles, we planned the union' (III, XI2 28).
My depiction ofLady Catherine as the 'villain ofthe piece', however, is not without its problems, particularly when her character is read through feminisflenses. For what, indeed, is so villainous about a woman being 'authoritative'? 'formidable'? even 'self-important'? (II,VI, 106) -all adjectives used to describe her.
Aren't these the very traits of her nephew, Dargr, the putative hero of the novel? Does this suggest, as all patriarchies have tried to, that what is a virtue in a man -strength -is a weakness in a woman: an unsexing of her; so that Lady Catherine's strength of character is an affront and, indeed, a challenge to patriarchal ideology? This rehabilitation of Lady Catherine as something like "a feminist icon -carried out in the critical literature of, for example, Johanna Smith (1992: 70)9 -is supported, in large part, by the nature of the status claims which Lady Catherine makes in her critique of the law, a critique which has some affinities with the feminism ofher day and today. Like both these feminists, Lady Catherine objects to a law which excludes women, the entail obtaining over Longbourn: 'I see no occasion for entailing estates from the female line -It was not thought necessary in Sir Lewis de Bourgh's family' (II, VI, 108). Her argument for inclusiveness, however, differs from the liberal critique ofher day or the critical legal feminist position of today; for Lady Catherine is no Mary Wollstonecraft declaring the 'rights of woman' (Wollstonecraft 1988), even less a Mary Jo Prug, proclaiming the 'politics of difference'.10 Certai~ly) it is Elizabeth's claims to at least conversational equality (she answers back on the matter of her sisters all being 'out' (II, VI, 109)) and difference (she refuses, at first~to tell her age (II, VI, 109)) which antagonises Lady Catherine. So instead of 'equality' feminism or 'difference' feminism, Lady Catherine's position might best be described as 'essentialist',11 what being more essential than birth itself: particularly the bond between mother and child. Hence, her advocacy of the Natural Law of the Mother's Body -the 'noble line' (III, XI~228) of the house of FitZWIlliam, her birth family -and her emphasis on the maternal, line from which both Ann de Bourgh and Fitzwilliam Darcy descend, as the deciding point in sealing their union. They both enjoy what the Inquisition called the limpieza de sangre, the 'purity ofblood ' Oohnson 1976: 307) , so conspicuously absent in the Bennet, but especially Gardiner strain. Indeed, in rebuke to Elizabeth's claim of the linguistic Law~fthe Father's Name ('I am a gentleman's daughter' III, XIV, 229), she says point-blank: 'But who was your mother? Who were you uncles and aunts? Do not imagine me ignorant of their condition?' (III, XIV: 229). So much for universal sisterhood, the suggestion being here, in this final showdown at Longbourn, that matriarchy can be just as divisive, just as oppressive, just as hamfisted as patriarchy at its most primitive.
There is something truly atavistic in Lady Catherine's endogamous sanction here, an anthropological overtone which is heightened by her cry that an alliance with a family which includes the Wickhams would 'pollute the shades of Pemberley' (III, XIV, 229), a phrasing evocative of Totem and Taboo.
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For Lady Catherine is a totemic figure -and, for Mr Collins, even more, a fetish -who bears comparison with the Freudian 'primal father'. Like the primal father, Lady Catherine speaks a sexual prohibition -a 'No. In thunder', refusing the exogomous marriage of Darcy to Elizabeth in favour of the endogomous marriage with Ann: 'Tell me once for all, are you engaged to him?', she demands~securing, in turn, Elizabeth's admission, 'I am not' (III, XIV: 229). And, equally, like the primal father, her prohibition, ultimately; is transgressed: it is Elizabeth's flat refusal ('I will make no promise of the kind', III, XIV: 229) not 'to enter into such an engagement' (III, XI~229) which teaches Darcy to 'hope' (III, XVI, 245) that a second proposal might not go amiss. But unlike the 'primal fat~er' who is, after all, himselfsacrificed by the tribe in Totem and Taboo, the 'primal mother' survives here, as the by the stay at the inn in BOQ]{ II, Chapter XVI where she is met by Lydia and Kitty). This crossroads is also an impasse. For where is Elizabeth to go? Having been 'foreclosed' from both instantiations of the status society -the Symbolic Order of the linguistic Law of the Father's Name (Longbourn), from which she is barred by virtue ofher sex; and the ImagInary Order of the Natural Law of the Mother's Body (Rosings), from which she is tabooed because ofthe impurity ofblood ofher kinship network -she now has only the Real of the hystericised, even psychotic economy of Meryton's regime of contract to which to return, a temptation which she rightly resists. All ofwhich raises the issue as to whether there is, somewhere else, an alternative space, another country, as it were, subject to a different kind of lawunfettered by status but more anchored than contract -in which Elizabeth can assume a subjectivity and establish a social tie. I would like to suggest that such a location presents itself while Elizabeth is on her rural rambles with those centres of moral authority, the Gardiners, during their Peak District holidays in Derbyshire. The scene is a famous·one, so I quote at some length:
The park was very large, and contained a great variety ofground. They entered it in one of its lowest points, and drove for some time through a beautiful wood, stretching over a wide extent.... They gradually ascended for half a mile, and then found themselves .at the top of a considerable eminence, where the wood ceased, and the eye was instantly caught by ... a large, handsome, stone building, standing well on rising ground, and backed by-a ridge of high woody hills -and, in front, a stream ofsome natural importance was swelled into greater, but without any artificial appearance. Its banks were neither formal, nor falsely adorned. Elizabeth was delighted (III, I, 156). This passage, describing Elizabeth's approach to, and arrival at the ancestral seat of the Dareys and her future home, Pemberley, is justly celebrated by narratologists like Michael Riffaterre (1990) , though not, as might be expected in a novel ofrealist conventions, for its scenic· detail. In fact, quite the reverse, since the passage utilises, as Riffaterre argues very persuasively, a language of descriptive markers which tell the reader virtually nothing in terms of setting: empty adjectives like 'large', 'beautiful', 'wide' and 'handsome', creating absolutely no pictur~for the reader. For what is really being envisaged here, according to Riffaterre, is not so much a picture ofa place as it is a 'portrait ofa lady', and, particularly -to continue the Jamesian analogy -ofher individual consciousness reacting to a place, registering her 'delight'; and, in so doing, indicating a complete shift in point of view, a reorientation of affect and a new love interest. Remember, Elizabeth will confide later to Jane, however tongue-in-cheek this confidence may seem, that she first fell in love with Mr Darcy when she first saw his 'beautiful grounds at Pemberley' (III, XVII, 240), a comment which echoes and renders explicit her feeling here that 'To be mistress of Pemberley would be something indeed' (III, I, 156).
As cop:1pelling as I find this reading, I would like to suggest another not so much as' an alternative but as complementary; one which stresses the exteriority ofthe physical scene as much as the interiority of Elizabeth's consciousness. For what does this scene represent but a house, specifically a country house in the grand style? Now the country house is a significant structural device and potent symbol in nineteenth and twentieth-century literature, evoking a range of associations, some national, some cultural, some political, but almost always legal. The country house is the house oflaw-whether natural, positivist or otherwise, the overarching question about it being the legal one ofwho will inherit, for example, Tipton? Gardencourt? Howard's End? Brideshead?This question ofinheritance, however, can be as much a burden as a benefit, even a curse, as amply demonstrated by the Gothicised, and sinister haunted houses of law found throughout the period, both in English literature (eg. in Dickens's Bleak House, the source of controversy in the case Jarndyce v jarndyce) , and in American literature (eg. in Nathaniel Hawthorne's House ofthe Seven Gables, the site ofseveral crimes -murder principally -perpetrated by, or against the Pyncheon family of Salem). Nothing could be further from the haunted house oflaw, however, than the representation ofPemberley here; indeed, the solidity of its foundations, the symmetry of its architecture, the harmony that obtains between it structure and natural setting, the timelessness of the style, all these details suggest, in their very coherence, integrity and abstractedness the ideal of the English common law as reimagined by not just the [I]f ... approached ... with a well-grounded knowledge of the general principles ofjurisprudence, and with the map ofa body oflaw distinctly impressed upon his brain, he ['the student ... of the English Law') might obtain a clear conception of it (as a system or organic whole) with comparative ease and rapidity ... he might perceive the various relations of its various part; the dependence of its minuter rules on its general principles; and the subordination of such of these principles as are less general or extensive, to such of them as are more general, and run through the whole of the structure (Austin 1954: 379). This 'approach' to this house of law, however, differs from Elizabeth's in that Pemherley is already a finished product, while the common law still requires massive repair work. For Austin's jurisprudential project was, like Bentham's, a blueprint ('the map of a body of law') for legal reconstruction which, if 'impressed on the brain', enabled one to see beyond the common law's 'arbitrary and unconnected rules' (Austin 1954: 379) , to the 'organic' method underlying its surface madness. The first step in releasing this organicism -the 'dependence' and 'subordination of part to whole, particular to general -was to strip bare the house of law of artifice, particularly those excrescences, 'legal fictions'13 which 'Judge & CO'14 had contrived to cover the gaps, cracks and fissures in the system's structural supports. Instead of concealing these design flaws, Bentham and Austin wanted first to expose them, bringing to light all the law's contradictions, indeterminacies and aporias. But this exposure only served to set the stage for their shared 'expository' agenda;15 for Austin, as much as Bentham, wanted to order, classify and structure the common law, resetting it on a 'posited) -man-made -foundation with none of the philosophical 'nonsense ':lpon stilts' of the Continental natural law tradition and its moral baggage ofeither revolutionary natural rights or reactionary Roman Catholic doctrine of the Aquinian sort. So the 'positivist' house of law which Bentham and Austin construct, and which Austen figures in Pemberley, is very different from, and indeed hostile to, the law ofstatus, either in the form of the Law ofthe Father's Name (the 'rights ofman', imaged in Longbourn)' or the Mother's Body (the divinely ordained hierarchy ofbirth, repre~ented in Rosings), and all their respective gender and class sanctions (no women need apply at Longbourn; no bourgeois at Rosings). Instead of these sanctions, a Rule of Law doctrine would hold sway in the positivist house oflaw, guaranteeing equal access to all. The same access, in fact, that obtains at Pemberley, as evidenced by Mrs Reynolds's obliging tour ofthe house (III, I), indicating that this space is not only open to the nobility (Col Fitzwilliam, Lady Catherine, Miss de Bourgh), the gentry (Darcy, Georgiana) and their class allies, the haut bourgeois (the Bingleys and Hursts), but the very middle class Gardiners of Cheapside and Elizabeth herself.
Anchoring this site ofopen access and free movement, and giving it a centr~-in sharp contrast to the flux of Meryton -is Fitzwilliam Darcy himselfwho, as master ofPemberle}', functions also as the utilitarian 'sovereign' ofthis house oflaw; a connection which Elizabeth makes explicit when she ruminates, 'As a brother, a landlord, a master, she considered how many people's happiness were in his guardianship -How much pleasure or pain it was in his power to bestow. How much good or evil must be done by him' (III, I, 158). Speculation, however, about the nature of Darcy's 'sovereignty' are almost instantly resolved by the good reports of Mrs Reynolds: the 'best landlord and best master' to his staff and tenants (III, I, 159); a 'good brother' to his sister, giving her 'whatever is~to give her pleasure' (III, I, '159); and a man of the most benevolent 'good-nature' who has never had a 'cross word' for his old housekeeper since he was four years old (III, I, 158). Now, given the source, this testimonial may sound like one of those sentimentalisations of the feudal order which abound in romance literature, usually ventriloquised by old retainers, nurses or mammies who love their masters, charges or white folk more than themselves; and that Darcy is the benign grandseigneur is preciselywhat his 'civility' (III, I, 165) and 'stately' manners (III, I, 164) suggest, initially, to the Gardiners: the whim ofa great man (III, 1, 164) (III, XVIII, 244) . A quick review oEher behaviour confirms that all she has done to provoke his love is snipe (as at the Meryton, Netherfield and Rosings where all is pointed innuendo), shout (as at Hunsford where innuendo is dropped for direct insult at his condescending proposal), or burst into tears (as at Pemberley when she receives the news of Lydia's catastrophic elopement). In what lies her attraction, aside from, as Elizabeth herselfplayfully suggests at the dose of the novel, her 'impertinence' (III, XVIII, 244)? A romantic reading ofthe novel would have Darcy looking through Elizabeth's 'impertinence' and straight into her soul through those windows to which he pointedl}', and much to the chagrin of Miss Bingley, refers as her 'fine eyes' (1, VII, 19) . But I would like to suggest that it is precisely this 'impertinence' -this resistance to Darc}', be it~ither passive (as at Meryton, Netherfield, Rosings or Pemberley), or active (as at Hunsford)-which is the source ofElizabeth's appeal, a choice example of the law of desire: of wanting what you cannot have.
I want, however, to link this psychic condition with earlier claims to Darcy's sovereign status because it is precisely this 'desire for the desire of the Other' which confirms his political and juridical role, though conceived now more in Austinian rather than Benthamite terms. For John Austin departs from, as much as disseminates, his old mentor's theories, largely dropping the utilitarian frame of Bentham's philosophy, and its reformist agenda (Morrison 1982: 2), in favour ofa definition ofsovereignty which focuses on power,16 a power which I think is at work in, and underpins the Darcy-Elizabeth match. The source of this power, according to Austin, is the sovereign who is nothing more than the one whose 'commands'are 'obeyed';17 hence, the popular sobriquet of the 'command theory of law' to describe his jurisprudence (Freeman 1994: 213-14) . And, certainly, if there is an Austinian sovereign in Pride andPrejudice, whose commands are, indeed, obeyed, it is Darcy. 'He is the kind of man', says the most querulous, least obliging character in the novel, Mr Bennet, 'to whom I should. never refuse anything should he condescend to act' (III, XVII, 242). Almost everyone else in the world ofthe novel evinces a similar habit of obediance towards Darcy, either sooner (like Bingle)', who needs his 'permission', as Elizabeth puts it, to court Jane (III, XVIII, 239» or later (like Wickham who is, eventually, induced to marry Lydia). All, of course, except one: Elizabeth Bennet. Her refusal to obey Dargr, in fact, is one of the constants of the novel: from her decline of his offer to dance at Lucas Lodge ('Mr Darcy with grave propriety requested to be allowed the honour of her hand; but in vain. Elizabeth was determined) (1, VI, 18» to the spectacular refusal ofhis proposal at Hunsford (where he is 'the last man in the world whom I could ever be prevailed upon to marry' (II, XI, 126».
Why Elizabeth refuses Darcy is attributable to her defining trait which Darcy says, at the end of the novel, attract~him in the first place: het'Hvdiriess of mind' (III, XVIII, 244) which enables her to see through, and critique his 'arrogance), 'conceit' and 'selfish disdain for the feelings of others' (II, XII, 126).
Certainly, Elizabeth is the critical intelligence of the book, both as a suspicious close reader of texts (think of how well she construes the real import of Caroline Bingley's letters) as well as of character itself, which she reads just as sceptically: the superciliousness of the Bingley sisters ('proud and conceited' (I, I\T, 11», the thoughtlessness ofMr Bingley (particularly his 'want of attention to other people's feelings' (II, I 90», the silliness of Collins ('Can he be a sensible man?', is her reaction, even before she meets him, to his letter of introduction (1, XIV, 44», the forwardness of her younger sisters ('Vain, ignorant, idle and absolutely uncontrolled', with Lydia a 'determined flirt' and Kitty sure to 'follow' Lydia's lead, (II, XVIII, 149», the glibness ofher father (she had 'never been blind to the impropriety ofher father's behaviour as a husband' (II, XIX, 152), the opportunism of Charlotte (upon the announcement of Charlotte's engagement, she feels the 'pang of a friend disgracing herself and sunk in her esteem' (I, XXII, 84», even the amiability oEher confidante and allyJane ('you are a great deal too apt you know, to like people in generar (1, I~J 1). This repeated emphasis on Elizabeth's capacity to critique -in short, to censure -suggests a jurisprudential analogue to parallel Darcy's sovereignty: that of the 'censorial' jurist who is not merely content to say what the law is (the 'expository' project of Austin) 18 but what it ought to be 19 -that is, a Benthamite reformer alert to the discrepancies, indeed, the iniquities of the juridical but also political status quo. And it is in embodying this reformist agenda of censorial critique which accounts for why Elizabeth, Jor all her acuity, is duped by Wickham: because Wickham tells her the story that she, as the critical legal lawyer -the censorial jurist, wants to hear, that of natural merit overlooked, even wronged by hereditary privilege, in Darcy's supposed refusal to bestow the beneficed living of Kympton on him, a narrative even Jane suspects ('her mild and steady candollr always pleaded for allowances, and urged the possibility of mistakes' (II, I). In allowing Elizabeth to be so 'blind, partial, prejudiced and absurd' (II, XIII, 135) in favour of Wickham at the expense of Darcy, Austen ironises critique and shifts the philosophical, political but particularly jurisprudential orientation ofthe novel away from Bentham, and his advocacy of the 'censoriar agenda, and towards Austin, and his focus on power, propped up by the 'expository' law. For John Austin~as much, if not more than Jane Austen -is motivated by a profoundly conservative vision of the law, and, indeed, politics and society;20" critique has no place here, Of, if it does, it must be brought to heel, co-opted, even silenced. 'Censorial jurisprudence' must, and is, in turn, censored in the work ofJohn Austin as well as Jane Austen. This is why, I would like to suggest, Darcy marries Elizabeth because, in so doing, the Austinian sovereign is co-opting his greatest critic -the 'censorial' jurist -who) in her refusal to obey, threaten~the delicate equilibrium ofthe 'expository' order of the positivist house of law. This co-opeation of critique by a reconstituted status quo is, as Gramsci has taught us,21 the standard ideological move of,modernity' because it produces the appearance of a society based on 'consent' when, in fact, it is predicated upon silence. And this is precisely what Darcy does to Elizabeth in her marrying her: he silences her. So much so, in fact, that from the moment he makes his second proposal at Longbourn, she loses her voice. Consider her response to his propos"al which we never actually hear spoken, but which is rendered through the most tortured circumlocution: 'Elizabeth feeling all the more common awkwardness and anxiety of his situation) now forced herself to speak; and) immediately) though not very fluently; gave him to understand) that her sentiment had undergone so material a change) sincerthe period he alluded) as to make her receive with gratitude and pleasure) his present assurances) (III) XVI, 235). We hear nothing directly here; and nor do we ever really hear directly from Elizabeth again, much to the concern of Jane ('My dear, dear Lizzy, I would -I do congratulate you -but are you certaint (III, XVII, 240» and the alarm of Mr Bennet eWhat are you doing? Are you out of your senses to be accepting this man?' (III, XVII, 242». All, in fact, we do hear is a kind of ventriloquism in which Elizabeth celebrates her sovereign, arguing that he has 'no improper pride' (III, XVII, 242). Gone) indeed, is critique. So Elizabeth's fate is sealed: she will be mistress of Pemberly, metonymised in terms ofits economy ofobjects, which her mother gloatingly itemises, 'how rich and great you will be! What pin-motley) what jewels, what carriages you will have! ... a house in town! Ten thousand a year!' (III, XVII, 243). These credits, however, are offset by the tremendous debt to be paid -the sacrifice of the Elizabeth's very self, her 'different voice' as Carol Gilligan (1982) might put itin order to reign as the silent chatelaine of the house of law.
I stress the word 'reign' in connection with Elizabeth's new role, because it is Darcy who continues to 'rule' at PemberleYJ even when -or rather, especially when -this rule is challenged in a minor way bYe Elizabeth's flippancy which gives so much 'astonishment' to Georgiana (III, XIX, 249) but which, interestingly, the reader never hears dialogised. Indeed, Darcy's rule is secured by Elizabeth's reign; her occasional dissent attesting to an overarching consent which, more than anything else, ensures the persistence of Pemberley and the social, political and legal values for which it stands. For what is the last scene of the novel but a rendering of Pemberley as the site of class reconciliation, visited not only by that emblem of status, Lady Catherine (who is, doubtless, there out of 'curiosity to see how... (Darcy's) wife conducted herself' (III, XIX, 249) but also the Gardiners, of whom, tellingly, the last line of the novel speaks. Why are the Gardiners the last characters to he referred to in Pride and Prejudice? On one level-the sentimental one -it is because, as the reader is told, they were the 'means ofuniting' Elizabeth and Darcy (II, XIX, 250) . So they seem to be the great romantic allies of Pemberley, but I would also like to suggest, on the basis of a more material reading -that of class analysis, that the Gardiners are also its greatest threat. For who are the Gardiners but the urban, affluent, educated bourgeoisie, precisely the class leading the calls for reform in England (for, indeed, the Reform Bill of 1832), and revolution elsewhere? Clearly in any other country Mr Gardiner would be a ]acobin, inciting the mob to burn Pemberly (and Rosings, Netherfield and Longbourn) to the ground, and guillotining its in~abitants -imagine the 'affability' and 'condescension' ofLady Catherine in the tumbrils, or better yet hanging from the entrails of Mr Collins. I allude to the sanguinary sentiment of the ]acobins -not content to rest until the last aristocrat was hanging from a lamp-post by the last priest's entrails -because it is against this political background that Jane Austen is writing; she, after all, had a cousin married to a French count who perished in the Terror.
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As well, it is this political future to which, with just as much if not more trepidation, John Austin looks forward in anticipating not just the Reform Act but Chartism and the 'making ofEnglish working class'. Hence, in light of these political threats, both past and future, it is absolutely critical that the middle-class Gardiners be integrated into the house oflaw, now positivised as the Austinian command ofthe sovereign' rather than the (divine right ofkings'. And where better than at Pemberley, because it is here that the Austinian (province ofjurisprudence' finds its determination: in mediating a very English compromise through a law which, in marrying· (pride' (Mr Darcy) to 'prejudice' (Elizabeth), preserves the forms of status (the organicism of the old order, imaged in the country house at harmony with nature), aU the while embracing the emergent forms of contract (the interests of commercial and industrial capital for which the Gardiners speak).
All ofwhich returns me to the question which entitles this article: Who wrote Pride and Prejudice? -Jane Austen or John Austin? This question of authorship is closely related to each author's relation to authority, and the troubling issue ofAustin's but, particularly, Austen's politics as either transgressive or regressive, liberal or conservative.
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I would like to argue, byway of conclusion" that they are both and neither liberal and/or conservative, a doubling which mimics the classic move of legal ideology of facilitating change at the very moment it conserves tradition. For example, Austen's politics, as much as Austin's, are liberal in that they both attack the world of status: he, in his assault on natural law, and the uncoupling of the positive law from morality; she, in her satires of the aristocracy (here in Lady Catherine, but also in Sir Walter Elliot, Miss Elliot and the Viscountess Dalrymple in Persuasion) and the Established Church (here in Mr Collins hut also in Mr Elton in Emma). Both, however, are conservative in the sense that the house of law each constructs becomes a sort of positivist panoptical prisonhouse, in which are consigned Austen's (censorial' heroines -Elizabeth at Pemberley, but also, Marianne Dashwood at Delaford, even Emma at her old home, Hartfield -and over which an Austinian sovereign commands: Mr Darcy, Col Brandon and Mr Knightle}'. But I would like to suggest that Jane Austen goes ·one step further than John Austin in that she actually supercedes both readingsthe liberal and the conservative -at the very moment she authorises each, opening up a space for a third.reading: one which might be called the critical.legal reading. For in rendering, at the close of the novel, both Elizabeth and Darcy as so thoroughly in situ at Pemberley, Austen points us to the critical legal insight that, far from being empty -and, hence, belonging to everyone because it belongs to no one, the house oflaw is inhabited. Who inhabits this house of law?: that is the question which critical legal studies will ask and answer, variously, and depending upon its particular stripe, as the ruling class (CLS in its Marxist form), the patriarch (CLS in its feminist form) and the coloniser (CLS in its race theory form). Austen has been quick to anticipate these answers, entwining these strands into the enraced, engendered and classified body of Mr Darcy. In exposing this white, male ruling class body behind, and indeed controlling the letter ofthe law, Austen contests, as much as confirms the positive law which Darcy represents, anticipating not only Austin's positivism but its critique. So, in answer to the question, 'who wrote Pride andPrejudice?') dearly Jane Austen; but, in so doing., Austen prolepticallywrites and then critiques Austins The Province ofJurisprudence Determined because in figuring jurisprudence as a stately home, Jane Austen looks not just to its 'determination' -that is, its boundaries -but beyond them, past its barriers to the crowds (the critical legal mob?) massing at its gates waiting to enter, ransack and put to the torch the positivist house oflaw. Pride and Prejudice (1993: 270) .
Notes
See the entry for 'entail' in Walker (1980) .
Bentham writes in a footnote: 'To this denomination has oflate been added orsubstituted the greatest happiness or greatestfelicity principle: this for shortness, instead ofsaying thatprinciple which states the greater happiness of all those whose interest is in question, as being the right and proper, and only right and proper and universally desirable, end of human action ' (1996: IIa) .
Indeed, the opening paragraph ofAn Introduction to the Principles ofMorals and Legislation explicitly links utility with this term, arguing that the purpose of this principle is 'to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law (1996: 11) . Such 'felicity', moreover, is subject to precise calculations as 
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pains on the other. The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure will give the good tendency of the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that individual person; if on the side of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole ' (1996: 40) .
I borrow, with some modification, Barbara Creed's phrase, the "monstrous feminine" -a very rich metaphor for Kristevan abjection (1993: 3).
See especially 'On the Moral Law' in Lacan (1992: 71-84) . Zizek (1991: 3, 7-11, 30-31, 231-4, 237-41 and 271) .
Smith emphasises, quite rightl}', the ambiguities of Eliabeth's 'victory over lady Catherine' which, while 'in some sense a feminist one, the episode also has antifeminist as well as antiaristocracy elements'. Lady Catherine is, after all a 'titled woman' and a spokesperson for 'matrilineal desire'. Freud writes: 'There is only a violent jealous father who keeps all the females to himself and drives away the growing sons. This primal state of society has nowhere been observed. The most primitive organisation we know, which today is still in force among certain tribes, is associations ofmen consisting of members with equal rights, subject to the restrictions of the totem system, and founded on matriarch}', or descent through the mother ' (1985: 883) .
A "legal fiction" is) according to The Oxford Companion to Law: ny assumption which conceals or affects to conceal the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, its operation being modified'. See the entry for 'Fiction, legal'. Bentham, particularly, was a vociferous critic of fictions. See Ogden (l932).
The term is, again, Bentham's, and used, highly pejoratively, to describe the judicial monopoly of the law, and its ill effects: piecemeal legislating, policy-less judging, linguistic legerdemain. See: Wacks (1995: 39); Postema (1986: 267) .
John Austin writes in The Uses o/the Study o/Jurisprudence that:
'As principles abstracted from positive systems are the subject of general jurisprudence, so is the exposition ofsuch principles its exclusive or appropriate object ' (1954: 366) .
Austin writes in The Province ofJurisprudence Determined that
Jaw is a species of command and that: 'A command is distinguished ... by the power and the purpose of the party commanding to inflict an evil or pain ' (1954: 14) .
Austin writes in The Province ofjurisprudence Determined: 'The superiority which is styled sovereignty ... is distinguished from other superiority, and from other society, by the following marks or characters: 1. The bulk of the given society are in a habit of obediance or submission to a determinate and common superior' (1954: 193-194 ).
Austin writes 'Having suggested the purpose of my attempt to determine the province ofjurisprudence: to distinguish positive law, the appropriate matter of jurisprudence, from the various objects to which it is related by resemblance, and to which it is related, nearly or remotely, by a strong or slender analogy ' (1954: 13 
